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Abstract—1+1 protection is a method to secure traffic between
two nodes against failures in between. The sending node dupli-
cates the traffic and forwards it over two disjoint paths. The
receiving node assures that only a single copy of the traffic
is further forwarded to its destination. In contrast to other
protection schemes, this method prevents almost any packet loss
in case of failures. 1+1 protection is usually applied on the optical
layer, on Ethernet, or on MPLS.
In this work we propose the application of 1+1 for P4-based IP
networks. We define an 1+1 protection header for that purpose.
We describe the behavior of sending and receiving nodes and
provide a P4-based implementation for the BMv2 software switch
and the hardware switch Tofino Edgecore Wedge 100BF-32X. We
illustrate how to secure traffic, e.g. individual TCP flows, on the
Internet with this approach. Finally, we present performance
results showing that the P4-based implementation efficiently
works on the Tofino Edgecore Wedge 100BF-32X.
Index Terms—p4, software defined networking, 1+1 protection
I. INTRODUCTION
There are various concepts to secure traffic transmission
against failure of path components such as links or nodes.
The fastest is 1+1 protection. A sender duplicates traffic and
forwards it over disjoint paths while the receiver forwards only
the first copy received for every packet. In case of a failure,
any packet loss can be avoided, which makes 1+1 protection
attractive for highly reliable applications. 1+1 protection is
implemented in optical networks to protect an entire trunk.
It is also available for MPLS [1] and Ethernet [2], which are
carrier technologies for IP and introduce signaling complexity.
In this paper, we leverage the P4 programming language [3]
to provide 1+1 protection for IP networks. We program P4
switches such that they feature IP forwarding, the sending and
receiving node behaviour of 1+1 protection which includes
IP encapsulation and decapsulation. We call this approach
P4-Protect. Targets of our implementation are the software
switch BMv2 and the hardware switch Tofino Edgecore Wedge
100BF-32X. A particular challenge is the selection of the fist
copy of every duplicated packet at the receiver. We provide
a controller that allows to set up 1+1 protection between
P4 nodes implementing P4-Protect. Furthermore, protected
flows can be added using a fine-granular description based
on various header fields. We evaluate the performance of P4-
Protect on the hardware switch. We show that P4-Protect can
be used with only marginal throughput degradation and we
illustrate that P4-Protect can significantly reduce jitter when
both paths have similar delays.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II gives an
overview of related work. Section III describes the 1+1 protec-
tion mechanism used for our implementation and extensions
for its use on the general Internet. Section IV presents a
P4-based implementation including specifics for the Tofino
Edgecore Wedge 100BF-32X. We evaluate the performance of
P4-Protect on the hardware switch in Section V and conclude
the paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
We review various resilience concepts for communication
networks. Afterwards, we give examples for 1+1 protection.
A. Overview
Rerouting reorganizes the traffic forwarding to avoid failed
components. This happens on a time scale of a second. Fast
reroute (FRR) locally detects that a next hop is unreachable
and deviates traffic to an alternative next hop [4]. The detection
may take a few 10s of milliseconds so that traffic loss cannot
be avoided. Both rerouting and FRR do not utilize backup
resources under failure-free conditions, but their reaction time
suffers from failure detection delay. 1:1 protection leverages
a primary/backup path concept. To switch over, the head-
end node of the paths needs to be informed about a failure,
which imposes additional delay. With restoration, recovery
paths may be dynamically allocated so that even more time
is needed to establish the restoration paths [5, p. 31]. 1+1
protection duplicates traffic and sends it over two disjoint paths
whereby the receiving node needs to eliminate duplicates.
That method is fastest, but it requires extra capacities also
under failure-free conditions. Some services can afford short
network downtimes, other services greatly benefit from 1+1
protection’s high reliability.
The surveys [6], [7], and [8] provide an overview of
various protection and restoration schemes. The authors of
[8] discuss survivability techniques for non-WDM networks
like automatic protection switching (APS) and self healing
rings (SHR) as well as dynamic restoration schemes in
SONET. They further describe protection methods for optical
WDM networks. A comprehensive overview of protection
and restoration mechanisms for optical, SONET/SDH, IP, and
MPLS networks can be found in [5].
SDN with inband signalling increases the need for fast and
local protection against failures because the controller may
no longer be reachable in case of a failure or highly loaded.
In addition, with SDN new protection mechanisms can be
implemented, e.g., to reduce state in the network. Examples
are given in [9].
ar
X
iv
:2
00
1.
11
37
0v
2 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 3 
Fe
b 2
02
0
B. 1+1 Protection
The ITU-T specification Y.1703 [1] defines an 1+1 path
protection scheme for MPLS. They add sequence numbers to
packets and replicate them on disjoint paths. At the end of the
paths, duplicate packets are identified by the attached sequence
number and eliminated. P4-Protect works similarly. However,
it does not require MPLS. It is compatible with IP, and works
over the Internet.
The authors of [10] compare several implementation strate-
gies of 1+1 protection, i.e, traditional 1+1 path protection,
network redundancy 1+1 path protection (diversity coding)
[11], and network-coded 1+1 path protection. Their analytical
results show that diversity coding and network coding can be
more cost-efficient, i.e., they require about 5-20% less reserved
bandwidth. The delay impact of 1+1 path protection in MPLS
networks has been investigated in [12]. McGettrick et. al [13]
consider 10 Gb/s symmetric LR-PON. They reveal switch-
over times to a backup OLT of less than 4 ms. Multicast
traffic has often realtime requirements. Mohandespour et. al
extend the idea of unicast 1+1 protection to protect multicast
connections [14]. They formulate the problem of minimum
cost multicast 1+1 protection as a 2-connectivity problem and
propose heuristics. Braun et. al [15] propose maximally redun-
dant trees for 1+1 protection in BIER, a stateless multicast
transport mechanism. It leverages the concept of multicast-
only FRR [16].
III. P4-PROTECT: CONCEPT
We first give an overview of P4-Protect. We present its
protection header, the protection connection context, and the
operation of the protection tunnel ingress and egress nodes
(PTIs/PTEs).
A. Overview
With P4-Protect, a protection connection is established
between two P4 switches. Protected traffic is duplicated by
a protection tunnel ingress (PTI) node and simultaneously
carried through two protection tunnels to a protection tunnel
egress (PTE) node. The PTE receives the duplicated traffic and
forwards the first copy received for every packet.
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Fig. 1. With P4-Protect, a PTI encapsulates and duplicates packets, and sends
them over disjoint paths; the PTE decapsulates the packets and forwards only
the first packet copy.
Figure 1 illustrates the protocol stack used with P4-Protect.
The PTI adds to each packet received for a protected flow a
protection header (P) that contains a sequence number which is
incremented for each protected packet. The packet is equipped
with an additional IP header (IP-PTE) with the PTE’s IP
address as destination. The PTI duplicates that packet and
forwards the two copies over different paths. The paths may
be different due to traffic engineering (TE) capabilities of
the network or path diversity may be achieved through an
additional intermediate hop. When the PTE receives a packet,
it removes its outer IP header (IP-PTE). If the sequence
number in the protection header is larger than the last sequence
number received for this connection, it removes the protection
header and forwards the packet; otherwise, the packet is
dropped. The latter is needed as duplicate packets are also
considered harmful.
B. Protection Header
The protection header contains a 24 bit connection identifier
(CID), a 32 bit sequence number (SN) field, and an 8 bit
next protocol field. The CID is used to uniquely identify a
protection connection at the PTE. The sequence number is
used at the PTE to identify duplicates. The next protocol field
facilitates the parsing of the next header. We reuse the IP
protocol numbers for this purpose.
C. Protection Connection Context
A protection connection is set up between a PTI and PTE.
Their IP addresses are associated with this connection, includ-
ing two interfaces over which duplicate packets are forwarded.
For each connection, the PTI has a sequence number counter
SNPTIlast which is incremented for each packet forwarded over
the respective protection connection. Likewise, the PTE has a
variable SNPTElast which records the highest sequence number
received for the respective protection connection. A CID is
used to identify a connection at the PTE. A PTI may have
several protection connections with the same CID but different
PTEs (see Section IV-E1).
D. PTI Operation
The PTI has a set of flow descriptors that are mapped to
protection connections. If the PTI receives a packet which
is matched by a specific flow descriptor, the PTI processes
the packet using the corresponding protection connection.
That is, it increments the SNPTIlast , adds a protection header
with CID, next protocol set to IPv4, and the SN set to
SNPTIlast . Then, an IP header is added using the PTI’s IP
address as source and the IP address of the PTE associated
with the protection connection as destination. The packet is
duplicated and forwarded over the two paths associated with
the protection connection.
E. PTE Operation
During failure-free operation, the PTE receives duplicate
packets via two protection tunnels. When the PTE receives a
packet, it decapsulates the outer IP header. It uses the CID
in the protection header to identify the protection connection
and the corresponding SNPTElast . If the SN in the protection
header is larger than SNPTElast , SN
PTE
last is updated by SN ,
the protection header is decapsulated, and the original packet
is forwarded; otherwise, the packet is dropped.
The presented behavior works for unlimited sequence num-
bers. The limited size of the sequence number space makes the
acceptance decision for a packet more complex. Then, a SN
larger than SNPTElast may indicate a copy of a new packet, but it
may also result from a very old packet. To solve this problem,
we adopt the use of an acceptance window as proposed in [1].
The window is W sequence numbers large. Let SNmax be
the maximum sequence number. If SNPTElast +W < SNmax
holds, a new sequence number SN is accepted if the following
inequality holds:
SNPTElast < SN ≤ SNPTElast +W (1)
If SNPTElast + W ≥ SNmax holds, a new sequence number
SN is accepted if one of the two following inequalities holds:
SNPTElast < SN (2)
SN < SNPTElast +W − SNmax (3)
This allows a packet copy to arrive SNmax − W sequence
numbers later than the corresponding first packet copy without
being recognized as new packets.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we present the implementation of P4-Protect.
We describe the supported header stacks, explain the control
blocks, their organization in ingress and egress control flow,
and we reveal implementation details about some control
blocks. Finally, we sketch most relevant aspects of the P4-
Protect controller.
A. Supported Header Stacks
Incoming packets are parsed so that their header values
can be accessed within the P4 pipeline. To that end, we
define the following supported header stacks. Unprotected
IP traffic has the structure IP/TP, i.e., IP header and some
transport header (TCP/UDP), and protected IP traffic has the
structure IP/P/IP/TP, i.e., the IP header with the PTE’s address,
the protection header, the original IP header, and a transport
header. IP traffic without transport header is parsed only up to
the IP header.
B. Control Blocks
We present three control blocks of our implementation of
P4-Protect. They consider the packet processing by PTI and
PTE.
1) Control Block: Protect&Forward: When the PTI re-
ceives an IP packet, it is parsed and matched against the
Match+action (MAT) table ProtectedFlows. In case of a match,
the packet is equipped with an appropriate header stack,
duplicated, and sent to appropriate egress ports. In case of
a miss, the packet is processed by a standard IPv4 forwarding
procedure.
2) Control Block: Decaps-IP: When the PTE receives an
IP packet with the PTE’s own IP address, the IP header is
decapsulated. If the next protocol indicates a protection header,
the packet is handed over to the Decaps-P control block;
otherwise, the packet is processed by the Protect&Forward
control block since the resulting packet may need to be
protected and forwarded.
3) Control Block: Decaps-P: In the Decaps-P control
block, the PTE examines the protection header and decides
whether to keep or drop the packet as it is a copy of an earlier
received packet. To keep the packet, the protection header is
decapsulated.
C. Ingress and Egress Control Flow
The interdependencies between the control blocks suggest
the following ingress control flow: Decaps-IP, Decaps-P, Pro-
tect&Forward. At a mere PTI, no action is performed by the
Decaps-IP and Decap-P control block. The Protect&Forward
takes care that protected traffic is duplicated and sent over
two different paths and that unprotected traffic is forwarded
by normal IPv4 operation. At a mere PTE, protected traffic is
decapsulated and selected before being forwarded by normal
IPv4 operation. Unprotected traffic is just forwarded by normal
IPv4 operation.
D. Control Block Implementations
In the following, we explain implementation details of
the Protect&Forward control block and the Decaps-P control
block. We omit the Decaps-IP control block as it is rather
simple.
1) Protect&Forward Control Block: The operation of the
Protect&Forward control block is illustrated in Figure 2. It
utilizes the MAT ProtectedFlows to process all packets. It
effects that protected traffic is encapsulated at the PTI with
a protection header and an IP header for tunneling.
ProtectedFlows
Match keys
Ternary
p.srcIP & p.dstIP
p.protocol & p.srcPort & p.dstPort
Action Parameters
protect
- i
- CID
- srcIP
- dstIP
- m_grp
- increment sequence number for next pkt
- add protection header with CID
- add outer ip header with srcIP and dstIP
Standard IPv4 forwarding
miss
Send to mulicat group m_grp
Fig. 2. The MAT ProtectedFows inside the Protect&Forward control block
is applied to IPv4 traffic.
The MAT ProtectedFlows uses a ternary match on the
classic 5-tuple description of a flow: the source and destination
IP address and port as well as the protocol field. In case
of a match, the MAT maps a packet to a specifc protection
connection and calls the protect action with the connection-
specific parameters i, CID, srcIP , dstIP , and m grp. The
protect action increments the register SNPTIlast [i] where i is a
connection-specific index to access a register containing the
last sequence number. On the Tofino target, this is performed
by a separate register action. The protect action further pushes
a protection header on the packet including CID, i.e., the
connection-specific CID, SNPTIlast [i], and the next protocol set
to IPv4. Then, it pushes an IPv4 header with the IP address
srcIP of the PTI as source IP and the IP address dstIP of
the PTE as destination IP. The protocol field of this outer IP
header is set to P4-Protect. Finally, the multicast group of
the packet is set to m grp. It is a connection-specific multicast
group. It effects that the packet is duplicated and sent to two
egress ports in order to deliver it via two protection tunnels
to the PTE. In case of a miss, the packet is unprotected and
handled by a standard IPv4 forwarding procedure, which is
not further explained in this paper.
2) Decaps-P Control Block: The Decaps-P control block
decides whether a packet is new and should be forwarded
or dropped. It compares the sequence number SN of the
packet’s protection header with the last sequence number of
the corresponding protection connection. The latter can be
accessed by the register SNPTElast [CID] where CID is given
in the protection header. The acceptance is decided based on
Equation (1) or Equation (3) depending on the value of SN
and W where W is given as a constant.
As the check is rather complex, it requires careful imple-
mentation for the Tofino target 1. It leverages the fact that we
set W = SNmax2 . Furthermore, it requires a reformulation of
Equation (1) and Equation (3).
If W ≤ SN holds, the following two inequalities must be
met:
SNPTElast < SN (4)
SN − SNPTElast ≤ W (5)
Otherwise, if SN < W , it is sufficient that only one of the
following two inequalities holds:
SNPTElast < SN (6)
W ≤ SNPTElast − SN (7)
Both cases are implemented as separate register actions on
the Tofino target. With 32 bit sequence numbers, a minimum
packet size of 40 bytes and a transmission speed of C = 1
Tb/s, a delay difference up to 1.6s can be compensated.
The BMv2 version of the implementation can be found
at Github2. The Tofino version of the implementation can
be accesses as member of the Barefoot Faster Program at
Barefoot Faster3.
E. Controller for P4-Protect
P4-Protect’s controller offers an interface for the man-
agement of protection connections and protected flows. It
1Tofino is a high-performance chip which operates at 100 Gb/s so that only
a limited set of operations can be performed for each packet, in particular in
connection with register access.
2Repository: https://github.com/uni-tue-kn/p4-protect
3Link: https://forum.barefootnetworks.com/
configures in particular the MAT ProtectedFlows but also
other MATs needed for standard IPv4 forwarding or IP de-
capsulation. In the following, we explain the configuration of
protection connections and protected flows.
1) Configuration of Protection Connections: A protection
connection is established by choosing registers on PTI and
PTE to record the last sequence numbers SNPTIlast and SN
PTE
last
of a protection connection. The connection identifier is the
PTE’s index to access SNPTElast . On the PTI, a different index
i may be chosen to access SNPTIlast . Furthermore, the registers
are initialized with zero. Moreover, the controller sets up a
multicast group m grp for each connection so that its traffic
will be replicated in an efficient way to the two desired
interfaces.
2) Configuration of Protected Flows: A protected flow is
established by adding a new flow rule in the MAT Protected-
Flows of the PTI. It contains an appropriate flow descriptor and
the parameters to call the action protect. Those are the index
i associated with the corresponding protection connection, the
CID needed at the PTE to identify the protection connection,
the IP address of the PTI, the IP of the PTE, and the multicast
group m grp.
V. EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate the performance of the imple-
mented mechanism on the Tofino Edgecore Wedge 100BF-
32X. First, we compare packet processing times with and
without P4-Protect. Then, we demonstrate that very high data
rates can be achieved with and without P4-Protect on a 100
Gb/s interface. Finally, we show that P4-Protect can provide a
transmission service with reduced jitter compared to the jitter
of both protection tunnels.
A. Packet Processing Time
P4-Protect induces forwarding complexity. To evaluate its
impact, we leverage P4 metadata to calculate the time a
packet takes from the beginning of the ingress pipeline to
the beginning of the egress pipeline. This is sufficient for a
comparison as all work for P4-Protect is done in the ingress
pipeline and all considered forwarding schemes utilizes the
same egress pipeline. We compare three forwarding modes:
a plain IP forwarding implementation (plain), P4-Protect for
unprotected traffic (unprotected), and P4-Protect for protected
traffic (protected).
Plain Unprotected Protected
PTI 100% 127% 166%
PTE 100% 127% 127%
TABLE I
INGRESS-TO-EGRESS PACKET PROCESSING TIME AT PTI AND PTE FOR
THREE FORWARDING MODES: PLAIN, UNPROTECTED, AND PROTECTED.
Table I shows the ingress-to-egress packet processing time
on both PTI and PTE for the three mentioned forwarding
modes. The duration is given relative to the processing time
for plain forwarding mode. We observe the lowest processing
time at PTI and PTE for plain forwarding as it has the least
complex pipeline. With P4-Protect, the processing time at
both PTI and PTE is larger than with plain forwarding as
the operations are more complex. At PTI, the processing time
is even larger with protected forwarding (166%) than with
unprotected forwarding (127%). At PTE, the processing times
for protected and unprotected traffic are equal and 27% longer
than with plain forwarding.
In our implementations, we have used only a minimal
IPv4 stack for all three forwarding modes. With a more
comprehensive IPv4 stack, the relative overhead through P4-
Protect is likely to be smaller.
B. TCP Goodput
We set up iperf3 connections between client/server pairs
and measure their goodput. Each iperf3 connection consists
of 15 parallel TCP flows. Two switches are bidirectionally
connected via two 100 Gb/s interfaces. Four client/server pairs
are connected to the switches via 100 Gb/s interfaces. Up
to 4 clients download traffic from their servers via the trunk
between the switches.
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Fig. 3. Impact of varying number of client/server pairs exchanging traffic
with iperf3.
Figure 3 shows the overall goodput for a various number of
client/server pairs, each transmitting traffic over a single TCP
connection. The goodput is given for the forwarding modes
plain, unprotected, and protected. We performed 20 runs per
experiment and provide the 95% confidence interval.
A single, two, and, three TCP connections cannot generate
sufficient traffic to fill the 100 Gb/s bottleneck link. However,
with four TCP connections a goodput of around 90 Gb/s is
achieved. This is less than 100% because of overhead due
to Ethernet, IP, and TCP headers and due to the inability of
TCP to efficiently utilize available capacity at high data rates.
Most important is the observation that all three forwarding
modes lead to almost identical goodput. The goodput for
protected and unprotected forwarding is slightly lower than
plain forwarding, which is apparently due to the operational
overhead of P4-Protect.
C. Impact on Jitter
We examine the effect of 1+1 path protection on jitter. Two
hosts are connected to two Tofino Edgecore Wedges 100BF-
32X. The switches are connected with each other via two paths
with intermediate Linux servers. Their interfaces are bridged
and cause an artificial, adjustable, uniformly distributed jitter.
We leverage the tc tool for this purpose [17]. All lines have a
capacity of 100 Gb/s.
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Fig. 4. Impact of 1+1 protection on jitter.
In our experiment, we send pings between the two hosts
with and without P4-Protect. Figure 4 reports the average
round trip time (RTT) deviation for the pings. Unprotected
traffic suffers from all the jitter induced on a single path.
Protected traffic suffers only from about half the jitter. This is
because P4-Protect forwards the earliest received packet copy
and minimizes packet delay occurred on both links.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we proposed P4-Protect for 1+1 path protection
with P4. It may be utilized to protect traffic via two largely dis-
joint paths. We presented an implementation for the software
switch BMv2 and the hardware switch Tofino Edgecore Wedge
100Bf-32X. The evaluation of P4-Protect on the hardware
switch revealed that P4-Protect increases packet processing
times only little, that high throughput can be achieved with
P4-Protect, and that jitter is reduced by P4-Protect when traffic
is carried over two path with similar delay but large jitter.
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